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Abstract Editorial board members, who are considered the gatekeepers of scientific 
journals, play an important role in academia, and may directly or indirectly affect the 
scientific output of a university. In this article, we used the quantile regression 
method among a sample of 1,387 university in chemistry to characterize the 
correlation between the number of editorial board members and the scientific output 
of their universities. Furthermore, we used time-series data and the Granger causality 
test to explore the causal relationship between the number of editorial board 
members and the number of articles of some top universities. Our results suggest that 
the number of editorial board members is positively and significantly related to the 
scientific output (as measured by the number of articles, total number of citations, 
citations per paper, and h index) of their universities. However, the Granger causality 
test results suggest that the causal relationship between the number of editorial board 
members and the number of articles of some top universities is not obvious. 
Combining these findings with the results of qualitative interviews with editorial 
board members, we discuss the causal relationship between the number of editorial 
board members and the scientific output of their universities. 
 
Keywords: editorial board member; gatekeeper; scientific output; quantile regression; 
Granger causality test  
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1. Introduction 
In academia, the editorial boards of scholarly journals have an important 
influence on the quality and relevance of published research (Garcia-Carpintero et al. 
2010); ‘it is considered that the critical mentality and decisions of editorial boards 
protect the social and intellectual integrity of science’ (Braun and Diospatonyi 2005a: 
1548). Editorial boards are important to the entire academic world, and there seems 
to be a possible relationship between a university’s representation on a journal’s 
editorial board and its scientific output in that journal. Editorial board members are 
considered gatekeepers of journals (Braun and Diospatonyi 2005b, 2005a, 2005c; 
Zsindely et al. 1982). ‘These gatekeepers, in controlling the system of manuscript 
evaluation and selection, occupy powerful strategic positions in the collective 
activity of the field’ (Zsindely et al. 1982: 58). Therefore, they may have an 
important influence on the scientific output of a university by holding academic 
influence (i.e., by deciding whether to accept or reject a manuscript, controlling the 
research themes of a journal, determining the hotspot domain and topics of the 
subject, and setting the academic evaluation criteria). Editorial board members are 
also usually eminent researchers; they are normally appointed on the basis of their 
own strong publication and citation records, and they may directly produce a 
substantial amount of high-impact scientific output for their affiliated universities. 
Thus, editorial board members may directly or indirectly affect the international 
influence of a university’s scientific output and may be important to the development 
and evolution of universities. 
4 
 
Several studies have examined the correlation between the number of editorial 
board members and scientific output of universities (Braun et al. 2007a; Burgess and 
Shaw 2010; Chan and Fok 2003; Chan et al. 2005; Gibbons and Fish 1991; Kaufman 
1984; Urbancic 2005). The general purpose of these studies was to use the number of 
editorial board members as an evaluation indicator to measure the scientific output of 
universities. Some studies found a positive correlation between university ranking 
based on the number of editorial board members and scientific output, whereas 
others did not. These studies have mainly focused on the fields of economics and 
management and have not yet yielded convergent results. In particular, existing 
studies have left the following gaps. 
First, though editorial board members may be important to universities and 
there may be some relationship between the number of editorial board members and 
the scientific output of universities, there has been a lack of study about the causality 
in this relationship. We know little about the direction of causality; that is, whether 
the number of editorial board members drives the scientific output or the scientific 
output drives the number of editorial board members. Previous studies on this 
relationship either calculated correlation coefficients or showed the overlap between 
the top performers in two types of rankings. However, correlation analysis, including 
regression analysis, cannot demonstrate a causal relationship. It may be more 
interesting to determine whether such a causal relationship exists between the 
number of editorial board members and the scientific output of universities and, if so, 
which drives which. Unfortunately, this important issue has been ignored in previous 
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studies. 
Second, few studies have characterized the correlation between the number of 
editorial board members and scientific output of universities. The overlap between 
top performers in two types of rankings says nothing about the medium and low 
performers. In contrast, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients estimate 
the effects of the number of editorial board members on the mean of the conditional 
distribution of scientific output. There are differences among universities, and it is 
possible that the relationship between the number of editorial board members and the 
scientific output of universities is different among universities in different parts of 
the conditional scientific output distribution. Therefore, showing the overlap 
between top performers or using OLS models to draw conclusions may result in an 
incomplete picture of this relationship. 
Third, most studies on the topic have used the number of articles published as 
an indicator of a university’s scientific output and have compared this number to the 
number of editorial board members. Few studies have used indicators related to the 
impact of the scientific output, such as the total number of citations, to measure the 
scientific output of universities. Citations per paper and institutional h index (an 
institution has index h if h of its Np papers have at least h citations each and the 
other (Np - h) papers have ≤ h citations) (Prathap 2006) have not been used in the 
existing literature. 
In this study, we examined chemistry subject at a sample of 1,387 universities 
and used the quantile regression method to investigate the variation in the correlation 
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between the number of editorial board members and the scientific output (as 
measured by number of articles, total number of citations, citations per paper, and h 
index) across the entire conditional scientific output distribution. Furthermore, we 
explored the causal relationship between the number of editorial board members and 
the scientific output of universities. We used time-series data and the Granger 
causality test to explore the nature of the causal relationship between the number of 
editorial board members and the number of articles of some top universities. We also 
interviewed some editorial board members about the causal relationship between the 
number of editorial board members and the scientific output of universities. We 
chose to focus on chemistry because the available data about the number of editorial 
board members in chemistry were relatively complete. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
analyze the mechanism behind the relationship between the number of editorial 
board members and scientific output of universities. Section 3 describes the research 
method. In section 4, we present the results. First, we conducted an empirical test of 
the correlation between the number of editorial board members and scientific output. 
Next, we examined the causal relationship between the number of editorial board 
members and the number of articles of top universities using the Granger causality test. 
Then, we interviewed several editorial board members from leading chemical journals 
on the subject of a causal relationship between the number of editorial board members 
and the scientific output of universities. Finally, in section 5, we discuss our main 
conclusions and suggestions for future research.  
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2. Theoretical Foundation and Related Work 
As mentioned earlier, there are empirical studies on the correlation between the 
number of editorial board members and the scientific output of universities (the two 
variables). However, the presence of statistical correlation cannot be used as an 
indication of a causal relationship. What is the mechanism of the relationship 
between the two variables? Could there be a causal relation? If so, which drives 
which? We supposed that there may be a mutually influencing mechanism between 
the two variables. 
 
2.1 The Influence of Scientific Output on the Number of Editorial Board 
Members  
In theory, editorial board members obtained their positions because of their high 
research achievements. In other words, only individuals with a strong record of 
published articles and citations are qualified as candidates for editorial boards. Cole 
and Cole (1973: 80) have argued that ‘unless editorial board members are appointed 
based on their scientific achievements, the academic community might find it difficult 
to view their authority as legitimate.’ Rynes (2006: 1098) asserted that ‘scholars with 
strong publication and citation records are the most obvious candidates to receive an 
editorial board invitation to an academic journal.’  
Therefore, regarding an individual scholar, their scientific output capacity 
influences his or her chances of being selected as an editorial board member. 
Extending this theory to the university level, the greater the quantity and impact of 
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research produced by a university, the greater the probability should be that the 
university has a higher number of editorial board members. This could be a possible 
mechanism behind the influence of scientific output on the number of editorial board 
members at universities. 
To our knowledge, there have been few empirical studies on the influence of 
scientific output of universities on the number of editorial board members. However, 
many studies have shown that editorial board members had high scientific output 
records; this has been true in various disciplines, such as medicine (Bakker and Rigter 
1985), nanotechnology (Braun et al. 2007b), management (Valle and Schultz 2011), 
and library and information science (Willett 2013). These studies indirectly indicated 
that editorial board members were selected based on their outstanding research ability. 
Valle and Schultz (2011) suggested that it would be unlikely for an editorial board 
member to get their paper published using their influence as a board member. It was 
more likely, the researchers argued, that editorial board members had a high number 
of published articles because of their own research abilities. Although some empirical 
studies have indicated that the scientific output records of editorial board members 
were not as high as expected, such as in the field of social work (Pardeck 1992; 
Pardeck and Meinert 1999), it has become a mainstream assumption in academia that 
editorial board members tend to have a higher research ability. 
 
2.2 The Influence of the Number of Editorial Board Members on Scientific 
Output 
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There are two possible reasons for the influence of the number of editorial board 
members at a university on the university’s scientific output. 
First, editorial board members may produce a substantial amount of high-impact 
scientific output for their universities owing to their outstanding research abilities. As 
mentioned in the above section on the influence of scientific output on the number of 
editorial board members, scholars are, at least theoretically, selected as editorial board 
members because they have demonstrated research achievements (e.g., strong 
publication and citation records). Further, it has been shown that board members 
usually have a higher research ability than their peers. Therefore, board members 
could contribute a certain amount of high-impact scientific output to their universities 
because of their own high research abilities, independently of their status as board 
members. These are actually two aspects of the same issue.  
Second, editorial board members, considered the gatekeepers of scholarly 
journals, may have a certain influence on the scientific output of their universities by 
controlling the academic discourse (e.g., controlling the research hotspots of their 
respective fields and the themes of journal articles, making decisions to publish 
journal articles, and setting the academic evaluation criteria of journals). Authors with 
similar academic backgrounds to these editorial board members (e.g., working in the 
same institution or graduated from the same institution) might share similar academic 
viewpoints, research topics, or research directions. Further, they might have similar 
preferences in research methods or paradigms. Owing to this conformity, authors from 
the same institutions as editorial board members might acquire academic recognition 
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more easily, and, therefore, their articles might be more likely to be published. 
Moreover, the research topic preferences of editorial boards might influence the 
research hotspots in the field, and might result in higher numbers of citations of 
articles related to these topics.  
Currently, there is, to our knowledge, no research that directly demonstrates that 
articles written by scholars from the same institutions of the editorial board members 
are more likely to be published and to have more citations owing to academic 
discourse controlled by board members. However, some scholars have investigated 
similar topics from indirect angles. For examples, Brogaard et al. (2014) found that, in 
the field of economics and finance, the articles written by colleagues of the editorial 
board members tended to have a higher acceptance rate, as well as a higher number of 
citations. Other empirical research has shown that articles written by authors from the 
same institutional background as editorial board members tend to have more citations 
(Laband and Piette 1994; Medoff 2003).  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Samples for Correlation Analysis 
The source for the journal sample used in our correlation study was the category 
of chemistry from Thomson Reuters’s 2011 Journal Citation Reports (Science 
Edition), comprising 514 journals that serve seven sub-disciplines: chemistry science, 
analytical; chemistry science, applied; chemistry science, inorganic & nuclear; 
chemistry science, medicinal; chemistry science, multidisciplinary; chemistry science, 
11 
 
organic; and chemistry science, physical. Between April and July, 2013, we visited the 
homepage of each journal to manually collect the names and affiliations of the 
gatekeepers having positions such as editor-in-chief, chief editor, co-editor, deputy 
editor, associate editor, regional editor, senior editor, editorial board member, or 
advisory board member. Furthermore, following Gibbons and Fish (1991), if editorial 
board members were affiliated with multiple institutions, we counted their names as 
many times as they appeared. From the total number of chemistry journals, 118 did 
not specify the names or affiliations of their editorial board members. Eventually, we 
acquired the information of 10,121 board members at 396 journals, who were 
affiliated with 1,387 universities. These universities constituted the sample for the 
correlation analysis of the number of editorial board members and the scientific 
output. 
To acquire data about the scientific output of the 1,387 universities, during 
October 2013 we used the advanced search section of the Thomson Reuters Web of 
Science. For example, to obtain the scientific output of Stanford University, we used 
the following search format: WC = (CHEMISTRY ANALYTICAL OR 
CHEMISTRY APPLIED OR CHEMISTRY INORGANIC NUCLEAR OR 
CHEMISTRY MEDICINAL OR CHEMISTRY MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR 
CHEMISTRY ORGANIC OR CHEMISTRY PHYSICAL) AND OG = (Stanford 
University). ‘WC’ and ‘OG’ refer to the discipline and name of the organization in 
Web of Science, respectively. In addition, we limited results to scientific output 
published between 2008 and 2012. Subsequently, we obtained data about the number 
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of articles, total number of citations (citations from 2008 to 2012 for articles published 
from 2008 to 2012), citations per paper (same as above), and h index (same as above) 
for the 1,387 universities by creating citation reports.  
The citation windows of five years and less are used here. It should be noted that 
the Spearman correlation between the long term (31 year) citation counts and the 
cumulative citation counts in years 1 to 5 are 0.266, 0.592, 0.754, 0.830, and 0.872, 
respectively; moreover, the potential error of using a short time window will be higher 
for highly cited papers (Wang 2013). However, Wang’s (2013) study was conducted 
at an individual paper level, not at an institutional level. ‘If we can assume that the 
shares of slow and fast ageing articles are the same for all focal authors and 
institutions to be evaluated, then using short citation time windows would penalize 
every evaluatee equally and therefore is less problematic for evaluation purposes’ 
(Wang 2013: 867). Some studies also suggested that using short citation time 
windows did not change the evaluation results much at the institutional level (Glanzel 
2008; Abramo et al. 2012). Therefore, the potential errors of using a short time 
window may not play a major role in our study.  
Moreover, with the purpose of reducing the fluctuations in citations per paper 
from universities with a small number of publications and obtaining a statistically 
valid and reliable analysis, we used an arbitrary threshold of 441 articles (which is 
10% of the mean value of the total number of publications produced by the five most 
productive universities) for calculating citations per paper. In total, we analyzed 531 
universities for the correlations between the number of editorial board members and 
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the citations per paper. 
 
3.2 Samples for Granger Causality Test  
We also collected time-series data for the Granger causality test using two 
variables: the number of editorial board members and the number of articles published 
per university. Since it was difficult to acquire time-series data for the number of 
editorial board members of all 1,387 universities for all journals, we referred to studies 
conducted by Brown (2007) and selected the following nine top journals as sample 
journals for this analysis: Journal of the American Chemical Society, Angewandte 
Chemie International Edition, Chemical Reviews, Accounts of Chemical Research, 
Analytical Chemistry, Biochemistry, Chemistry of Materials, Inorganic Chemistry, 
and Journal of Organic Chemistry. Since the majority of these journals did not reveal 
the affiliations of their editorial board members until 1998, we chose the period from 
1998 to 2014. 
We faced the risk that there might be a limited number of board members from 
each university every year at these nine journals, so we used the Shanghai ranking’s 
top 20 universities (their number of editorial board members was higher every year) in 
chemistry as our sample universities for the Granger causality test. First, we recorded 
and calculated the number of editorial board members over the years of 20 universities 
from 1998 to 2014 at the nine journals. Next, to minimize statistical errors caused by a 
limited number of board members from each university every year and to obtain more 
reliable results, we artificially set a threshold: only universities with no less than five 
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editorial board members for at least one year were considered qualified for our 
Granger causality test. Fourteen universities constituted the final sample for this 
analysis. 
Using the aforementioned advanced search function of Thomson Reuters Web of 
Science, we obtained the number of articles published in the nine journals each year 
from 1998 to 2014 at 14 universities. Data for both the number of editorial board 
members and the number of articles were collected in June 2015. 
 
3.3 Samples for E-mail Interview 
To deepen our understanding of the relationship between the number of editorial 
board members and the scientific output, we conducted semi-structured interviews 
with several board members from the nine journals. Considering that most of the 
board members resided outside of China, interviews were conducted via e-mail. The 
semi-structured interview guide included questions regarding possible causal 
mechanisms (aforementioned; see the theoretical foundation section) between the 
number of editorial board members and the scientific output of universities. There 
were five questions included (Appendix A). 
Each editor-in-chief and the deputy editor of the nine journals were the potential 
subjects of our interviews. In addition, since there were many other editorial board 
members, we used the website www.random.org/nform.html as a tool to randomly 
select three other members of each journal as potential interview subjects. Next, we 
used Google to reach the official websites of the universities with which these board 
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members were affiliated, from which websites we sought to obtain the board 
members’ e-mail addresses. Next, we sent individual e-mails containing the interview 
questions to each of the selected subjects. In total, 130 e-mails were sent. We set one 
month as our response period, and 16 board members answered our interview 
questions within this time range. All e-mails were sent in July 2015. The number of 
respondents per journal is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Number of respondents per journal.  
Journal Name Number of respondents 
Number of chief editor or 
deputy editor respondents 
Accounts of Chemical Research 0 0 
Analytical Chemistry 5 4 
Angewandte Chemie International Edition 3 2 
Biochemistry 1 1 
Chemical Reviews 2 2 
Chemistry of Materials 0 0 
Inorganic Chemistry 0 0 
Journal of Organic Chemistry 2 2 
Journal of the American Chemical Society 3 2 
Total 16 13 
 
3.4 Granger Causality Test Models 
In this study, we used the Granger causality test to investigate the causal 
relationship between the number of editorial board members and the number of 
articles published at top universities. The Granger causality test is a statistical 
hypothesis model for causal prediction based on time-series data (Granger 1969). It is 
a commonly used method for examining causal relationships between variables in 
economics and management.  
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The basic principle of the Granger causality test is as follows: To examine 
whether a variable X is the cause of another variable Y, a restricted regression model 
such as formula (1) should be established first to show that Y can be explained by its 
own past values. Then, past values of X as the explanatory variable are introduced into 
the formula (1) to form an unrestricted regression model, yielding formula (2). If 
introducing past values of X can significantly improve the prediction level of Y, then 
X is said to be the Granger cause of Y. Similarly, these steps can be repeated to 
determine whether Y causes X. 
m
t 0 i t i t
i 1
Y Y  

                                        (1) 
m m
t 0 i t i j t j t
i 1 j 1
Y Y X    
 
                                (2) 
In our study, X represents the number of editorial board members and Y represents 
the number of articles. 
0 is a constant, t is a white noise sequence, i  and j  are 
coefficients, and m is the number of lagged terms. For both formulas (1) and (2), the 
longer the lag length, the better it reveals the dynamic features of the models. However, 
if the lag length is too long, the freedom of the model will be reduced. There needs to be 
a balance between the two variables. Moreover, from the perspective of actual 
publishing cycles, the publishing cycle of articles from the American Chemical Society 
is 4–8 months; from the perspective of editorial board members as a research 
manpower input, some scholars choose a lag of 1–3 years (Brogaard et al. 2014; Yu 
2013). However, from the perspective of the period when the editorial board members 
obtained their positions, there is no fixed standard. Based on the above factors and for 
the sake of prudence, we selected a lag length of 1–4 years for our test. 
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To date, the Granger causality test model has been applied to a number of studies 
in the field of scientometrics (Inglesi-Lotz et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2011). Eviews 6.0 
software was used for all statistical analyses. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Analysis of Ordinary Least Squares Regression and Quantile Regression  
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables selected for this study. In our study, the independent variable was 
measured as the number of editorial board members affiliated to a particular 
university; the dependent variables were measured by the number of articles, total 
number of citations, citations per paper, and h index. 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of dependent/independent variables. 
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
     
 Number of articles 505.27 631.65 283.00 0.00 4870.00 
 Total number of citations  4938.69 7502.10 2125.00 0.00 63009.00 
Citations per paper 9.76 3.45 9.52 2.99 24.68 
H index 23.44 14.77 21.00 0.00 94.00 
Panel B: Independent variable 
     
 Editorial board members 7.30 11.45 3.00 1.00 118.00 
 
First, we estimated four OLS models, for which the results are shown in Table 3. 
As expected, the results show that the number of editorial board members is 
positively and significantly (p < 0.01) related to the scientific output (as measured by 
the number of articles, total number of citations, citations per paper, and h index) from 
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their universities. 
 
Table 3.  Results of the OLS regressions. 
 Coeff. SE t statistic P value 
Panel A: Dependent variable (number of articles)    
Editorial board members 39.072
*
 1.047 37.318 0.000 
Constant 220.159
*
 14.210 15.494 0.000 
R
2    0.501 
F-test   F = 1392.597 (P = 0.000) 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test   χ2 = 64.341 (P = 0.000) 
Panel B: Dependent variable (total number of citations)    
Editorial board members 532.534
*
 10.265 51.878 0.000 
Constant 1052.762
*
 139.311 7.557 0.000 
R
2    0.660 
F-test   F = 2691.370 (P = 0.000) 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test   χ2 = 141.252 (P = 0.000) 
Panel C: Dependent variable (citations per paper)    
Editorial board members 0.123
* 0.008 15.080 0.000 
Constant 7.906
* 0.175 45.058 0.000 
R
2    0.301 
F-test   F = 227.421 (P = 0.000) 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test   χ2 = 21.231 (P = 0.000) 
Panel D: Dependent variable (h index)    
Editorial board members 0.957* 0.023 41.121 0.000 
Constant 16.458
*
 0.316 52.107 0.000 
R
2    0.550 
F-test   F = 1690.913 (P = 0.000) 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test   χ2 = 128.839 (P = 0.000) 
Note. * significant at 1% significance level. 
 
However, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test demonstrated the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the four OLS regression models (Table 3). Heteroscedasticity 
was also revealed by the scatter plot of the number of editorial board members and the 
scientific output indices. For example, Figure 1 shows that the dispersion of the 
number of articles increased with the number of editorial board members, which is a 
typical characteristic of heteroscedasticity. If we trace these divergent trajectories, we 
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might get regression lines with different slopes depending on whether we consider the 
higher quantile (i.e., dotted line R1) or lower quantile (dotted line R2) of the 
conditional scientific output distribution, and R is the regression line calculated based 
on the results of OLS. In other words, the relationship between the number of editorial 
board members and the scientific output of universities may be different when the 
universities are in different quantiles of the conditional scientific output distribution. 
Considering this feature of our data, to gain a better understanding and obtain a more 
complete picture of the relationship between the number of editorial board members 
and the scientific output of universities, we conducted a quantile regression analysis.  
 
Figure 1.  The heteroskedastic relationship between the number of editorial board members and the 
number of articles. 
 
We computed 19 quantile regression estimates (5%–95%, in 5% increments). 
Figures 2–5 plot the coefficient values at various quantiles of the number of articles, 
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total number of citations, citations per paper, and h index, respectively, together with 
the OLS estimates. Specific data for each quantile can be found in Appendix B.  
 
Figure 2.  Coefficient estimates for the number of articles, with 95% confidence intervals. The 
horizontal axis represents the quantile; the vertical axis shows the estimated parameter. The dashed 
horizontal line represents the OLS estimate. The estimated parameters of the quantile regression are 
displayed as circles. The 95% confidence intervals are displayed as solid lines. 
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Figure 3.  Coefficient estimates for the total number of citations, with 95% confidence intervals. The 
horizontal axis represents the quantile; the vertical axis shows the estimated parameter. The dashed 
horizontal line represents the OLS estimate. The estimated parameters of the quantile regression are 
displayed as circles. The 95% confidence intervals are displayed as solid lines. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Coefficient estimates for the citations per paper, with 95% confidence intervals. The 
horizontal axis represents the quantile; the vertical axis shows the estimated parameter. The dashed 
horizontal line represents the OLS estimate. The estimated parameters of the quantile regression are 
displayed as circles. The 95% confidence intervals are displayed as solid lines. 
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Figure 5.  Coefficient estimates for the h index, with 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal axis 
represents the quantile; the vertical axis shows the estimated parameter. The dashed horizontal line 
represents the OLS estimate. The estimated parameters of the quantile regression are displayed as 
circles. The 95% confidence intervals are displayed as solid lines. 
 
Quantile regression results show that the coefficient for editorial board members 
in relation to the scientific output (any of the number of articles, total number of 
citations, citations per paper, or h index) is positive and significant at the 1% level for 
all the quantiles. Furthermore, the coefficient gradually increases from the lower to 
the upper quantiles of the conditional distribution of scientific output (any of the 
number of articles, total number of citations, citations per paper, or h index), which 
indicates that the coefficient of the number of editorial board members on the 
indicators of scientific output is greater (smaller) when the university is at the higher 
(lower) quantile of the conditional distribution of scientific output. We should note 
here that the editorial board coefficient of the quantile regression that relates to the 
number of articles and total number of citations is above the OLS results at the higher 
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quantiles, and below the OLS results at the lower quantiles. The OLS models 
underestimate the editorial board members coefficient that relates to the citations per 
paper and h index for the 25% quantile and above. Therefore, quantile regression 
models reveal more information than is evident in the OLS models.  
The interpretation of the results from quantile regressions will be discussed in 
combination with the results of the Granger causality test in the next section. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Granger Causality Test 
The prerequisite of the Granger causality test is that the two series are stationary 
or co-integrated, otherwise the problem of ‘spurious regression’ might occur. 
Therefore, it was necessary to conduct unit root and co-integration tests in the number 
of editorial board members and number of articles time series for the 14 universities. 
For this purpose, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Johansen co-integration tests 
were used. Eventually, we conducted the Granger causality test on the nine 
universities whose number of editorial board members and number of articles either 
satisfied the condition of being stationary or being co-integrated (Table 4). 
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Table 4.  Granger cause test between the number of editorial board members and the number of 
articles of universities (1998-2014).   
Rank University EB PUB 
Co- 
integration 
EB→PUB PUB→EB Lag 
1 UC-Berkeley I(1) I(1) √ 
1.669 1.975 
4 
（0.316） （0.263） 
2 Harvard University I(1) I(0) 
 
/ / / 
 
3 Stanford University I(0) I(0) 
 1.697 1.952 
1 
 （0.215） （0.186） 
4 
Northwestern 
University 
I(2) I(1) 
 
/ / / 
 
6 MIT I(1) I(1) √ 
1.269 2.098 
2 
（0.323） （0.174） 
7 
California Institute 
of Technology 
I(0) I(1) 
 
/ / / 
 
8 ETH-Zurich I(0) I(0) 
 0.704 5.162
**
 
2 
 （0.518） （0.029） 
     0.693 4.443
**
 
3 
     （0.585） （0.048） 
     0.507 5.283
*
 
4 
     （0.737） （0.068） 
9 Kyoto University I(0) I(0) 
 1.384 1.246 
4 
 （0.380） （0.418） 
10 UCLA I(1) I(1) √ 
5.644
**
 1.529 
1 
（0.034） （0.238） 
     4.693
**
 2.211 
2 
     （0.037） （0.160） 
11 
University of 
Pennsylvania 
I(0) I(0) 
 0.812 49.647
***
 
4 
 （0.578） （0.001） 
12 Yale University I(0) I(0) 
 0.001 0.621 
1 
 （0.971） （0.445） 
13 UC-Santa Barbara I(1) I(0) 
 
/ / / 
 
18 UC-San Diego I(1) I(1) √ 
2.017 0.282 
4 
（0.257） （0.876） 
20 University of Tokyo I(0) I(1) 
 
/ / / 
 
Note. EB, PUB represent respectively the number of editorial board members and the number of 
articles.  
Column 1 is the 2014 Shanghai ranking of the selected universities in chemistry.  
Columns 3 and 4 state, respectively, the data characteristics of the EB and Pub serials. If the series 
itself is stationary, we represent it by I (0). If the series are integrated with order n, we represent it by I 
(n). 
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Column 5 uses ‘√’ to indicate that the two series were co-integrated. 
Columns 6 and 7 represent the F-value of the Granger causality test. P-value in parentheses: ‘***’, 
‘**’, and ‘*’ significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level.  
Column 8 is the lag phase. For the three universities that had a significant causal relationship 
between the two variables, the lag phases having a significant causal relationship were all provided. For 
universities with no detected causal relations during lag phase 1 to 4, we only present an optimal lag 
phase based on the Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
The results showed that for the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), 
the number of editorial board members was the Granger cause of the number of 
articles in lag phases 1 and 2. By contrast, for Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
Zurich (ETH-Zurich), the number of articles was the Granger cause for the number of 
editorial board members in lag phases 2, 3, and 4. For the University of Pennsylvania, 
the number of articles was the Granger cause of the number of editorial board 
members in lag phase 4. There was no significant causal relationship in either 
direction for the other six universities. The regression equations of UCLA, 
ETH-Zurich, and the University of Pennsylvania based on the Granger causality test 
model (2) are shown in Table 5.  
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Table 5.  Regression equation based on Granger causality test model of the three universities where 
Causal relationships were detected. 
Lag Regression equation based on Granger causality test model 
 Part A: UCLA 
1 Yt = 91.979＋0.379 Yt-1－4.508 Xt-1 
2 Yt = 152.597＋0.150 Yt-1－0.078 Yt-2－4.405 Xt-1－4.053 Xt-2 
 Part B: ETH-Zurich 
2 Xt = 4.700＋0.622 Xt-1－0.374 Xt-2＋0.054 Yt-1－0.062 Yt-2 
3 Xt = 4.583＋0.902 Xt-1－0.529 Xt-2－0.168 Xt-3＋0.050 Yt-1－0.085 Yt-2＋0.033 Yt-3 
4 
Xt = 8.617＋0.533 Xt-1－0.185 Xt-2－0.334 Xt-3－0.501 Xt-4＋0.039 Yt-1－0.060 Yt-2 
－0.005 Yt-3＋0.019 Yt-4 
 Part C: University of Pennsylvania 
4 
Xt = 5.617＋0.304 Xt-1＋0.625 Xt-2－0.069 Xt-3＋0.777 Xt-4－0.007 Yt-1－0.025 Yt-2 
－0.027 Yt-3－0.042 Yt-4 
Note. X, Y represents respectively the number of editorial board members and the number of articles. 
Bold and italics denote the associated  p-values lower than 5%. 
 
Although the Granger causality test results suggested unidirectional causality, 
either from the number of editorial board members to the number of articles or the 
reverse, in the above three universities, the established regression equations of these 
three universities based on the Granger causality test model (2) were contradictory 
with respect to meaning. For example, the coefficient of Xt-1 was significantly 
negative (p < 0.05) in the equation of lag phase 1 of UCLA, and the coefficient of Xt-1 
was also significantly negative (p < 0.05) in the equation of the lag phase 2 of UCLA, 
indicating that when the number of editorial board members from UCLA increased in 
the previous phase, the number of articles published would decrease in the current 
phase. This indication was apparently contradictory. Similar issues occurred in the 
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situation of ETH-Zurich and the University of Pennsylvania. 
Based on the above results, there was no apparent causal relationship between the 
number of editorial board members and the number of articles from the universities 
we selected for the Granger causality test, which was different from our prior 
hypothesis of causality. The results differing from the hypothesis may be attributed to 
the following two reasons. 
First, the annual changes in the numbers of editorial board members in the tested 
universities were not obvious. For example, the minimum number of editorial board 
members per year from Stanford University was five, while the maximum number 
was nine. During the period of 1998–2014, the number of editorial board members 
changed only insignificantly, and it was therefore not easy to show a good 
corresponding relation with the number of articles, where there were more obvious 
changes. As a result, it was difficult to detect a causal relation between the two 
variables. 
Second, the causal relationship between the number of editorial board members 
and the number of articles of universities might not be ‘rigid’. In other words, an 
increase or decrease of one variable does not necessarily cause a significant increase 
or decrease of the other. The universities we selected were the world’s leaders in 
chemistry, and increasing or reducing one or two editorial board members at these 
universities might have little effect on the number of articles of these universities. The 
changes in both the number of editorial board members and the number of articles 
could be a result of the combined influences of several factors, such that the number of 
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editorial board members or the number of articles was only one of several factors. 
Research funding, research personnel input, and research policy could also be 
factors that affect a university’s scientific output. Therefore, although the number of 
editorial board members could be the same, the influence of this variable on 
universities’ scientific output could differ, (e.g., the regression lines with different 
slopes shown in Figure 1). This indicates the existence of other possible influencing 
factors, such as research input or research policy. The difference between universities 
in research input or research policies may be the cause of the difference in the relation 
between the number of editorial board members and scientific output at different 
conditional scientific output distribution quantiles. Since it is difficult to acquire the 
research input data and research policies of universities in a single discipline, we did 
not include these factors in our model. 
From the perspective of factors affecting the selection of board members, 
although board members were usually excellent scholars with outstanding research 
ability, there were still other factors influencing their selection. For example, since 
editorial board members had to review many manuscripts, which might take time that 
could be used to conduct scientific research, some excellent scientists might choose 
not to serve as editorial board members. In addition, geographical factors and reviewer 
experience were also factors considered in board member selection. 
 
4.3 Analysis of Interviews with Editorial Board Members 
The following sections summarize the responses of the editorial board members 
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to the interview questions, which included: 
 Do editorial board members have an influence on academic discourses? 
 Is there any misuse of editorial power? 
 Do editorial board members have strong publication and citation 
records, and are these criteria for selecting board members? 
 Is there a causal relationship between the number of editorial board 
members and the scientific output of universities? 
All content inside quotation marks is directly quoted from respondents’ 
interviews. 
 
4.3.1 Do Editorial Board Members have an Influence on Academic Discourses?  
Most respondents believed that editorial board members had no or only a little 
influence on academic discourses. They thought that the influence of academic 
discourses on the scientific output of a university should not be overstated. This 
influence may be limited, with the publication of an article instead depending on 
whether there are new discoveries and contributions in the article, as well as the 
quality of articles themselves. As mentioned in the results and discussion of the 
Granger causality test, editorial board members’ academic discourses might be only 
one of several factors that influence a university’s scientific output; other factors, such 
as research funding, human input, and research policy, may also play important roles.  
However, several respondents pointed out that board members had an influence 
on the themes or research fields of the articles selected for the journal. For example: 
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‘Editorial board members do have influence on the choice of themes for the journal; 
that is one of their primary tasks at the Editorial Board meetings’; ‘Each journal needs 
to define which direction of research is relevant for the journal and which direction 
one thinks will be important in the future. Such things are always subjective, and it is 
clear that as the editors define the direction of the journal, they have an influence 
about which type of research is published.’ 
 
4.3.2 Is there any Misuse of Editorial Power?  It should be noted that although 
board members may influence academic discourses, this does not mean that they 
misuse their own journals to help themselves or their universities publish unworthy 
articles. Our emphasis was on factors such as controlling the themes and research 
direction of journals, setting the academic evaluation criteria of journals, and 
preference in certain academic viewpoints or research paradigms. 
The majority of the respondents believed that there was little misuse of power 
among editorial board members, or that this phenomenon was rare in their journals, 
which confirms the results of previous studies (Bosnjak et al. 2010; Frandsen and 
Nicolaisen 2011; Sugimoto and Cronin 2012). Combining the answers given by the 
respondents, we found three reasons that respondents thought it unlikely that board 
members of SCI journals abuse their editorial power. First, journals’ peer review rules 
prevent an editorial board member from processing or reviewing their own articles or 
any articles that might have a conflict of interest, including articles from their 
colleagues or students. Second, since editorial board members usually have a better 
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record of publication and citations and are capable of producing high-quality articles, 
abusing their power to publish their own papers would be unnecessary, and even 
harmful to their academic reputations. Third, journal articles will eventually be 
published and supervised by peers. Scientific journals have been around for 
approximately 350 years, and it is almost impossible to imagine that they could have 
survived for so long if articles were mainly published for egoistical reasons. If this 
were the case, they would not be read by scientists (Frandsen and Nicolaisen 2011). 
 
4.3.3 Do Editorial Board Members have Strong Publication and Citation 
Records, and are these Criteria for Selecting Board Members?  Nearly all 
respondents believed that the editorial board members of their journals had strong 
publication and citation records. This result was in line with the mainstream belief in 
the academic community and the findings of some previous research (Bakker and 
Rigter 1985; Braun et al. 2007b; Valle and Schultz 2011; Willett 2013). 
As for the selection criteria of editorial board members, having a strong 
publication and citation record was the most frequently mentioned (10 respondents). 
Therefore, we considered that having a strong publication and citation record is a basic 
standard or prerequisite in the selection of editorial board members. Other factors may 
also affect board member selection. The selection of the editorial board is a 
comprehensive process, taking various factors into consideration. In addition to 
having a strong publication and citation record, respondents mentioned the following 
criteria: academic prestige (seven respondents), research fields (three respondents), 
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geographical location (three respondents), experience as a reviewer (two respondents), 
and contributions to the journal (one respondent). 
 
4.3.4 Is there a Causal Relationship between the Number of Editorial Board 
Members and the Scientific Output of Universities?  Most respondents believed 
that there was no causal relationship between the number of editorial board members 
and the scientific output of universities, or that there was a non-causal correlation 
between the two variables. Thus the interview results confirmed the results of the 
Granger causality test and the regression analysis. As discussed in the results of the 
Granger causality test, the causal relationship between the number of editorial board 
members and the scientific output of universities might not be rigid, i.e. an increase or 
decrease of one variable does not necessarily cause a significant increase or decrease 
of the other. Furthermore, the positive and significant correlation between the number 
of editorial board members and the scientific output of universities revealed by the 
regression results may reflect some respondents’ opinion that ‘strong universities tend 
to have strong researchers who are more likely to be recruited as editors of 
international journals.’   
Since editorial board members, as the gatekeepers of journals, differ from other 
types of research personnel, most respondents did not note a causal relationship 
between the two variables because they were considering the causal relationship from 
the perspective that editorial board members control the academic discourse. From 
this perspective, the causal relationship between the two variables may be unobvious, 
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confirmed by most respondents’ responses to the first interview question. Therefore, 
from the perspective that editorial board members control the academic discourse, we 
believe that board members’ academic discourse might influence a university’s 
scientific output, but to a limited extent. 
Moreover, we believe that editorial board members usually have high research 
ability and are mainly selected based on their strong publication and citation records, 
which is also confirmed by the responses to the third interview question. From this we 
further speculate that the greater the quantity and impact of research produced by a 
university, the more chance there is that the university has a higher number of editorial 
board members. Similarly, board members could also contribute a certain amount of 
high-impact scientific output to the university because of their own high research 
ability. Therefore, we speculate that there may be mutual causality between the 
number of editorial board members and the scientific output of universities from the 
perspective that editorial board members have high research ability.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we examined the relationship between the number of editorial 
board members and the scientific output of universities in the field of chemistry. For 
the study period (2008–2012), our empirical results indicated that the number of 
editorial board members is positively and significantly related to the quantity and 
impact of the scientific output (as measured by the number of articles, total number 
of citations, citations per paper, and h index) of their universities. In addition, we 
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observed from quantile regressions that the coefficient of the number of editorial 
board members on the indicators of scientific output is greater (smaller) when the 
university is at a higher (lower) quantile of the conditional distribution of scientific 
output. Our quantile regressions revealed information that was not observable with the 
OLS model. 
More importantly, our Granger causality test results show that the causal 
relationship between the number of editorial board members and the number of 
articles of some top universities in chemistry is not obvious. Furthermore, the 
interview results regarding the causal relationship between the number of editorial 
board members and the scientific output of universities confirmed the results of the 
Granger causality test and the regression analysis. 
There are some limitations to note, which also suggest directions for future 
research. First, this study used the total number of citations, citations per paper, and h 
index to measure the impact of scientific output of universities. However, it should be 
noted that citation as an evaluation indicator is not a direct reflection of the quality or 
importance, or even the impact, of scientific output; it only partially reflects the 
impact of scientific output because it is determined partly by the impact of the paper 
on the advance of scientific knowledge, but also partly by other factors, including 
various social and political pressures (Martin and Irvine 1983). Future studies could 
investigate other evaluation indicators, such as h-like index or peer evaluation, to 
obtain convergent results and diminish the impact of other factors. Second, some 
details of the research await improvement. For example, the editorial board members 
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could be divided into three groups: the editor-in-chief, the deputy editor, and other 
editorial board members. Additionally, different journals have different levels of 
academic influence, among which we did not distinguish in this study. Moreover, 
because of the difficulties of data collection, we did not include other variables 
influencing scientific output in our regression analysis. Future studies could further 
categorize the board members according to specific positions and journals according 
to their academic influence, as well as introduce more variables related to scientific 
output, to reach a more accurate result. Third and finally, our empirical results are 
limited to chemistry. More studies are needed to investigate whether our conclusions 
can be extended to other disciplines. 
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Appendix A 
Questions of the E-mail Interviews for Editorial Board Members 
1. Do you think there is an influence of academic discourses in the process of 
reviewing manuscripts? For example, are articles having similar research topics, 
paradigms and philosophies to those production of editorial board members more 
easily recognized in academia and accepted? (The academic discourse mentioned 
here does not refer to academic misconduct, but emphasizes preferences and 
recognition in research topics, paradigms, academic perspectives and evaluation 
criteria.) 
2. In contrast to the academic discourse noted in Question 1, is there any misuse of 
editorial power, for instance, to help themselves, or their universities publish 
unworthy articles? 
3. Do editorial board members of your journal have a strong publication and citation 
record? What are the selection criteria involved in appointing editorial board 
members in your journal?  
4. Is there a causal relationship between the number of editorial board members in a 
university and the quantity and impact of scientific output of the university? If yes, 
would you be able to elaborate on the dynamics of the relationship, e.g., which 
drives which?  
5. Do you have anything else to say on the topic, that you think is especially 
important? 
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Appendix B 
Quantile Regression Estimates (percentiles 5%–50%) 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
 
Part A: Dependent variable (number of articles) 
EB 22.462 26.452 29.762 31.884 32.530 33.652 34.667 35.686 36.647 38.781 
 
1.469 1.463 1.434 0.936 0.840 0.986 1.211 1.437 1.917 2.625 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Const -19.923 -13.357 -7.762 1.279 11.470 26.348 41.333 59.629 80.706 97.219 
 
2.711 3.126 4.242 3.433 3.952 6.384 6.512 8.655 9.700 11.843 
 
0.000 0.000 0.068 0.710 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.212 0.253 0.280 0.301 0.315 0.325 0.333 0.342 0.347 0.352 
 
Part B: Dependent variable (total number of citations) 
EB 270.080 299.620 331.415 368.098 390.300 405.560 443.000 473.333 503.450 547.238 
 
13.975 13.044 12.051 15.570 11.976 16.675 22.406 25.360 26.791 25.087 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Const -440.160 -299.619 -280.829 -279.098 -240.300 -159.560 -150.000 -71.333 4.550 30.524 
 
61.621 24.895 21.213 29.240 28.413 38.676 58.369 71.352 72.787 84.805 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.318 0.950 0.719 
R
2
 0.210 0.275 0.312 0.338 0.359 0.376 0.391 0.407 0.423 0.438 
 
Part C: Dependent variable (citations per paper) 
EB 0.079 0.095 0.111 0.115 0.123 0.129 0.127 0.132 0.127 0.140 
 
0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.017 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Const 4.360 5.021 5.379 5.845 6.053 6.284 6.653 6.875 7.224 7.430 
 
0.222 0.193 0.268 0.230 0.179 0.205 0.222 0.195 0.241 0.267 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.092 0.128 0.143 0.156 0.165 0.171 0.172 0.170 0.165 0.161 
 
Part D: Dependent variable (h index) 
EB 0.779 0.840 0.901 0.949 1.000 1.000 1.025 1.056 1.083 1.091 
 
0.076 0.062 0.060 0.047 0.051 0.050 0.047 0.054 0.055 0.048 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Const 3.221 5.160 7.099 8.154 9.000 11.000 11.975 12.944 14.167 14.909 
 
0.303 0.422 0.525 0.491 0.509 0.460 0.403 0.512 0.530 0.357 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.181 0.212 0.231 0.252 0.268 0.283 0.295 0.310 0.325 0.339 
Note. For each of the quantiles, the following data are provided: the coefficient estimate, the standard 
error (1,000 bootstrapping replications), and the associated p-value (bold and italics denote p-values 
lower than 1%). For each quantile, we provide the pseudo R
2
 to measure how well the data fit the 
estimated quantile regression models. EB represents the editorial board members, CONST is a constant, 
and R
2
 is a pseudo R
2
.  
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Quantile Regression Estimates (percentiles 50%–95%) 
 
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
 
Partl A: Dependent variable (number of articles) 
EB 38.781 42.250 46.500 49.364 51.873 55.125 60.188 63.680 70.833 84.706 
 
2.625 3.352 3.295 2.896 2.957 3.645 5.056 4.148 6.876 10.299 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Const 97.219 110.750 125.500 151.273 184.164 220.625 254.625 335.960 451.500 652.294 
 
11.843 12.913 15.120 15.035 16.028 17.777 27.071 31.396 44.562 76.520 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.352 0.357 0.362 0.366 0.369 0.370 0.368 0.367 0.367 0.368 
 
Part B: Dependent variable (total number of citations) 
EB 547.238 561.078 590.714 632.404 659.958 685.429 742.824 775.000 882.333 1109.000 
 
25.087 22.574 27.574 24.691 22.704 29.924 32.735 56.425 65.438 111.888 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Const 30.524 230.922 366.286 471.597 699.167 918.714 1241.158 1761.000 2443.333 3369.000 
 
84.805. 79.542 88.647 84.611 103.216 131.468 152.012 260.389 311.466 587.190 
 
0.719 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.438 0.454 0.468 0.482 0.495 0.507 0.517 0.524 0.531 0.536 
 
Part C: Dependent variable (citations per paper) 
EB 0.140 0.135 0.148 0.148 0.150 0.149 0.156 0.151 0.157 0.151 
 
0.017 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.024 0.058 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Const 7.430 7.843 8.141 8.444 8.761 9.147 9.485 10.008 10.715 12.368 
 
0.267 0.305 0.286 0.255 0.215 0.229 0.174 0.315 0.347 0.878 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.161 0.163 0.168 0.175 0.184 0.193 0.205 0.214 0.213 0.205 
 
Part D: Dependent variable (h index) 
EB 1.091 1.118 1.156 1.173 1.167 1.167 1.200 1.269 1.320 1.375 
 
0.048 0.060 0.065 0.058 0.055 0.061 0.077 0.068 0.117 0.188 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Const 14.909 15.882 16.688 17.827 18.833 20.667 21.600 23.154 26.080 30.625 
 
0.357 0.415 0.503 0.526 0.458 0.566 0.394 0.740 0.920 1.279 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.339 0.350 0.359 0.369 0.378 0.386 0.393 0.392 0.387 0.392 
           Note. For each of the quantiles, the following data are provided: the coefficient estimate, the standard 
error (1,000 bootstrapping replications), and the associated p-value (bold and italics denote p-values 
lower than 1%). For each quantile, we provide the pseudo R
2
 to measure how well the data fit the 
estimated quantile regression models. EB represents the editorial board members, CONST is a constant, 
and R
2 
is a pseudo R
2
. 
